During discussions held in preparation for the XI World Congress of Sociology, some people suggested, half in jest, that the keynote for the meeting should be borrowed from Daniel Bell's book on ideology in a more cruel version: 'The end of sociology'.
Some of the sociologists on the ISA Executive Committee felt that very few novelties have emerged, in the field of Grand Theory at least, from a reading of sociological journals and papers published in the last ten years. Not without envy, this generation has seen anthropology bask in the limelight, with structuralism and Foucault's 'critique of culture', leaving professional sociologists somewhat lacking in imagination, and without the necessary zest even to tackle 'middle-range' theories.
Esprit de corps has prevailed, however, and here we are with redoubled creative vigour, ready to discuss the most classic of sociological themes: theories of social change.
Suffice it to cast but a critical glance over these theories: it will easily be seen that in spite of everything there are new ideas to expound, and that far from withering away, sociology is pressing ahead with the task of delineating fresh programmes for research and interpretation.
What then are these new ideas?
I shall proceed with my introductory exposition in two sections: the first deals with subject matter, and the second with modes of interpretation. I shall leave the section on techniques to more competent specialists in the field.
sociology's classical age. It was the summit of theoretical ambition to aspire to determine the 'laws' of social evolution.
Underlying these notions was the old idea of 'progress', revived by the Enlightenment and victorious in the nineteenth century. Sociology contemptuously ignored the scepticism of the historians as to 'general processes' of change, and proceeded unruffled with its search for regularities which could explain global social changes.
More modest in their ambitions, the post-classical and post-critical sociologists (if I may thus designate the Kantians a la Weber) remained convinced of the nomothetic value of social science but were more emphatic in applying their passion for generalising about change to partial aspects of society (changes in society, but not in the type of society). To a large extent, they focussed on the transformational action of active social agents in processes of interaction (individuals and groups), rather than on action at the level of structures (reforms and revolutions) or even that of key institutions in society (such as property and the state).
Here we encounter a major change in the themes to which sociologists gave priority. While Durkheim had taken the social division of labour, a universal process, to study the more general and recurring aspects of change through his 'average types' and to put forward 'laws' which applied to each basic form of 'transhistoric' sociability; while Marx Lipset's (1967) claim to explain democratic institutionalisation in Latin America, or Rostow's (1953) (1952) suggests that the effect of industrialisation is to reduce families to the size of the 'nuclear family' (parents and children), he is formulating a theory of this type. So is Tocqueville (1952) Boudon (1984 : 192) Following this cautious line of interpretation, Boudon draws attention to the need to refer explication not to the broad overriding processes of change, but to specific temporal and spatial elements, and to the need to pin them down within global structures, which may well have their own rules of change, although these will be less susceptible to explication in a strictly scientific sense. This is the final point to which I want to draw your attention in this paper. It is that, although they are not testable for scientific validity after the neopositivist manner, there are interpretations of change that even authors in the Kantian tradition, such as Boudon, accept as being interesting.
Boudon in fact distinguishes a logical progression which runs from the enunciation of possibilities to conditional laws, via the enunciation of conjunctures which may be more or less likely to happen. These conjunctures occur when a given state of possible affairs is more likely to happen than another state of affairs which is opposite to the first; for example, Tocqueville's (1952) formulation, quoted above, on the effects of liberalising an authoritarian order.
As to enunciations of possibilities or conditional laws, these fit more directly into Popper's logic, in the form of questions for which there are answers whose validity can be scientifically tested. One example of this type of scientific 'discovery' (similar in procedure to the logic of natural science) is Trevor-Roper's (1972) ' (1984 : 207) .
Moreover, Boudon goes on, a great number of theories of change are not empirical but formal. He exemplifies this with Hotelling's (1929) well-known article on stability in competition, and with Hirschman's ( 1981 ) reinterpretations of the same model for its application to politics. And the same is true of the well-known study by Parsons and Smelser (1956) Boudon's constat is opposed to postulat in his words, because 'determinism is not a condition for knowledge, but a particular quality of the process in which presence or absence depends on the very structure of the process ' (1984 : 192) .
